Back to Basics
November 25, 2008
The Round
Adjudicator: Neill Harvey-Smith (Debate Chamber)
Tournament: Oxford Inter-Varsity Competition 2008
Location: Oxford, UK
Dates: November 7-8, 2008
Motion: “This House Would Negotiate With Al-Qaeda”
Teams: OP: (3rd) Aliyah Akram and Charlotte Thomas (Cambridge)
OO: (1st) Yulia Tell and Elena Zhukova (HSE Moscow)
CP: (2nd) Luke Harris and Shane Lyons (UCC Philosophical Society)
CO: (4th) Filip Popovic and Richard Robinson (Manchester)
Abstract: The OP limit the debate to hostage-taking situations. The OO make powerful arguments without overtly linking them to OP’s points. CP move onto the effects on Al-Qaeda without directly linking back to OO’s points. CO question the definition but then rebut and summarise stylishly.
Discussion
This debate was messy and the adjudicators were unable to distinguish quickly between the teams. The Opening Proposition limited the debate to hostage-taking situations. The Opening Opposition made powerful arguments without overtly linking them to Opening Proposition’s points. Closing Proposition moved onto the effects of negotiations on Al-Qaeda without directly linking back to Opening Opposition’s points. Closing Opposition questioned Opening Proposition’s definition but then rebutted and summarised stylishly.
The panel quickly agreed that Opening Proposition’s definition was fair, but could have been improved by some sense, even a word, about how and where in the world Al-Qaeda might be currently taking hostages. Opening Proposition’s substantive arguments were under-developed. “It is a role of the state to save lives” was not explained or balanced against other roles of the state, like the conduct of foreign policy. The harms of inaction were that “we will come across as callous and that will let them win,” which didn’t give us a real picture of the causal chain by which the callousness is made manifest. Similarly, “if we pay them off, they will look less strong” was not properly substantiated. The tragic case of Ken Bigley was mentioned, but not tied convincingly to either point.
Opening Opposition took a different tone to the gentle, more theoretical Cambridge approach. The angrily delivered opening—that Al-Qaeda wanted to destroy Western civilisation—certainly grabbed attention. The Opening Opposition’s main arguments were: that paying ransoms will turn hostages into tools for trading so more hostages will be captured; that Al-Qaeda had no central point to negotiate with, no aims or conditions which could realistically be met; that there is no basis to rely upon promises made; that this would show fear and strengthen their recruiting efforts. HSE gave a credible account. But nowhere did they specifically tie their points to the Opening Proposition’s arguments, showing how they rebutted the proposition case. This created work for the adjudicators in forming a direct comparison: upon reflection, the points of the Opening Opposition could be construed to deal directly with Opening Proposition’s case. In a panel discussion featuring tension between “The Opening Opposition didn’t rebut” and “The Opening Opposition were more persuasive,” the latter criterion decided it.
Closing Proposition started weakly with a “why now” argument, based on the unsubstantiated premise that people are sick of the war on terror. Their second idea was that there were two types of Al-Qaeda: those who don’t have objectives and those who do. We should negotiate with type two, calling their bluff by offering them things they have been asking for. When the West reveals itself amenable to reasoned negotiation, they will lose a powerful recruiting tool and weaken.
The third Proposition speaker, who introduced these ideas, never explained why we should believe his characterisation of Al-Qaeda over the disparate, cellular, rag-tag organisations described by Opening Opposition. It would be convenient if there were moderate Al-Qaeda operatives with whom to negotiate, but who are they and where can they be found? His partner, in a good, articulate summary of his side, gave the first, damning example of a bargaining chip: the demand that US troops leave Saudi Arabia. Opening Proposition had specifically excluded such major concessions as part of their model. Adjudicators were left confused, after four proposition speeches, about the basics: to whom do we talk, about what, for what?
Closing Opposition were stylistically strong. However, they started with a full minute challenging the right of Opening Proposition to narrow the debate to hostage-taking situations. They questioned whether Al-Qaeda even take hostages. Irrespective of the truth or falsehood of this claim, it was bad strategy. Closing Opposition must not introduce a definitional challenge to a debate. When they finally moved on, there was some strong rebuttal on weaker proposition points: Obama won vowing to take troops out of Iraq but into Afghanistan to challenge Al-Qaeda, so are people really sick of the war on terror? The summary was clear and organised, but points were mishandled. There was little in the speech that moved beyond Opening Opposition, sending a clear sign to the adjudicators that his partner’s contribution had been insufficient.
In the final analysis, we had to weigh several competing factors. Closing Proposition had asserted a distinction between types of Al-Qaeda without properly justifying it and based a lot of analysis on that distinction. The Proposition summary was the best speech in the round, but the Closing Proposition hadn’t done enough to beat Opening Opposition. Closing Opposition were stylistically strong but had committed a terrible error in challenging the definition. Seeing the debate through that prism, they had added little new.
We placed Opening Opposition first and Closing Opposition fourth. Deciding between Opening Proposition and Closing Proposition was tough. Both had flaws in argumentation, Opening Proposition not expanding well, Closing Proposition not establishing their premise. Opening Proposition had been active, making points of information throughout. We preferred the style of the latter team; on balance, we found them marginally more persuasive in the round.
This debate highlights the importance of the basic question in debating: was this persuasive? In a messy debate, where teams have varying strengths, there can be a temptation for judges to try to disqualify teams based on their weaknesses. This should be avoided in favour of a return to the basic question. Similarly, teams should ensure that they do the simple things well, articulating where the debate is and how they intend to progress it. Fundamental skills—like refutation, identifying the proper locus of the conflict and role fulfilment—take on new importance in a debate difficult to decide on substantive issues.
