Seeking Consensus

December 12, 2008

The Round

Adjudicator:          Ian Lising (University of La Verne)

Tournament:        2008 Oxford Intervarsity Championship (Final Round)

Location:              The Oxford Union, Oxford University, England

Date:                    November 8, 2008

Motion:                “This House would make the number of votes a person can cast in an election inversely proportional to their wealth.”

Teams:                 OG: (4th) LSE Woon Lee and Rushabh Ranavat (England)

OO: (3rd) Loyola Marymount Kevin Kiley and Mike Aguilera (USA)

CG: (1st) Middle Temple Daniel Warents and Douglas Cochran (England)

CO: (2nd) UCC L&H Stephen Boyle and Ian Boyle Harper (Ireland)

Abstract: There is the round that happened in the debate chamber and the round as it happens in the deliberation. The adjudication panel must always strive to avoid assessing both debates rather than the appropriate one. Muddling through a tough read on a round can complicate things and often leads to an interesting result. This article will take you behind closed doors to see how consensus is reached. It should be noted that the decision as posted above was not the actual announced result at the event. The only result announced was the winning team. The rest of the decision comes as a representation of the adjudication conferral, which took nearly two hours.

Discussion

The PM started with the humorous, self-deprecating announcement that they were “so not going to win this round!” then preceded to say, “We have one case we prepped, and the other that we came up with while the Irish were singing. Which do you want to hear?” After the laughter died down, he decided to present both. This would have been clever, had the two concepts not led to inherent contradictions with one another.

Beyond the obvious problems, the Opening Government case was incomplete and banked on the DPM’s more serious attempt to restore them as a relevant team in the round. So this easily rendered them the fourth-placed team in the final.

The Opening Opposition’s case was straightforward. Head-to-head, they clearly defeated the case that came in front of them and had a decent Opposition line. The Closing teams both had plausible extensions and did enough to move the round past the top half. However, herein lies the problem. It wasn’t a clear “bottom half” round, a phrase used to describe a situation in which the Closing teams successfully take both of the Opening teams out of contention. The eight panelists who had one of the Closing teams as the winning team actually had the other Closing team as the THIRD placed team and unanimously had the Opening Opposition in second. The adjudicator with the Opening Opposition team in first needed to be swayed in either direction with regard to both closing teams.

Consensus adjudication, as the name suggests, seeks unanimity in the perceptions of the adjudication panel. Normally, following a healthy discussion, adjudicators may be moved to reassess their perspectives on the round after taking into consideration what other panelists may have observed differently in the debate; this discussion typically leads to a true consensus. If no such consensus emerges, a straight majority vote is taken. Votes are carried out position by position until all the four places have been awarded. Unfortunately, in the final round at this year’s Oxford IV, a simple vote produced no clear winner.

The greatest challenge that spilt votes presents an adjudication panel (more specifically, the Chair) is that there is a fine line between conducting a discussion that would potentially move everyone into a consensus and merely allowing people to “dig their heels in” and justify their opinions at all costs. The Chair has to be sensitive to the amount of time within which a fair decision should be made. A preliminary round at a major intervarsity tournament, for example, will require a decision within 10 to 20 minutes. This pales in comparison with the one to two hour-long marathons endured by panels in the break rounds.

The sentiment that many have correctly opined is, “What is the difference between a preliminary round and a final? Shouldn’t the panels be equally careful is both deliberations? So what goes on in there?”

Each adjudicator is given the task of representing their complete view on the round with the other adjudicators carefully observing that they are not interceding for teams in the round. This often happens when adjudicators unwittingly end up interpreting the speeches in a biased fashion. Many times, the speech ends up sounding a lot better in the words of the adjudicator than it did during the actual round itself. It is not the adjudicator’s role to bridge the gap between what the speaker said and what the speaker meant to say. Conversely, there are times when an adjudicator “dislikes” the presentation of debater because the adjudicator silently rebutted the points, arguments, or even the entire case for himself.

Neither condition is necessarily so in this study, given the considerable adjudication experience that each of the members of the panel possessed. Additionally, specific care was taken in each instance of the round’s evaluation. Each adjudicator carefully checked one another for “interpretive” rather than “representational” viewpoints. Taking the same type of care in pouring through each adjudicator’s process is what helps a panel reach a communal rationale. But, this is what inevitably takes a whole lot more time than preliminary round discussions. Additionally considering that there were nine people in this panel whereas most preliminary rounds would consist of just three.

Knowing when to end the discussion comes down to answering a simple question, “Is there anything that anyone can possibly do or say to help you change your mind about this decision?” If the answer is “Yes,” then the discussion might prove successful in getting a more accurate read of the round. If not, then carrying on with the deliberation process will exhaust time and effort for no reason whatsoever. This is when a straight vote should be taken. In the case of the 2008 Oxford IV, the vote went 5-4 for the Closing Government. The sad part here is that the Opening Opposition on paper had eight votes to be second place, but the Closing Opposition had four votes to be in first. So, the Closing Opposition must come in second. The Opening Opposition would have to take the tough third and the Opening Government takes the fourth.

Language: The Importance of “Packaging”

December 12, 2008

The Round

Adjudicator:        Logandran “Logan” Balavijendran (Chung Ang University, Korea)

Tournament:       MMU British Parliamentary Open

Location:             Multimedia University, Malaysia

Dates:                 December 11, 2005

Motion:               “This house believes that torture is a necessary evil.”

Teams:                OP : (4th) G.S.E (Azrul & Azahan)

OO: (2nd) MMU 1 (Sumi & Kandahar)

CP : (1st) McTate (Tate & Mac)

CO : (3rd) IIU1 (Irma & Raihan)

Abstract:    The Opening Proposition defines torture vaguely, using more extreme examples, and hinges the case upon its effectiveness in garnering information from suspected terrorists. Opening Opposition attacks the effectiveness of apprehending terrorists and pushes other alternatives. Closing Proposition delicately shapes the definition of torture by using clear examples, and in extension argues torture as a deterrent, thereby absorbing some of Opening Opposition’s argumentation.

Discussion

This motion places a moral value on torture and requires Opening Proposition to defend something “evil” by arguing it is necessary. The Opening Proposition thus needs to present a clear picture of torture as a tool and show how effective it can be to achieve good. Many limits on torture would reduce how “evil” it is, but also might limit its effectiveness as an interrogation tool. Poor definition of this scope early in the debate could create problems for closing teams, especially Closing Proposition.

The Prime Minister defines torture as “that defined by the Attorney General of the USA”, who in turn identifies such actions as those that “do not cause severe pain” and avoid “causing internal organ failure” but does not give examples of what is acceptable and not acceptable. In response to a POI, the Prime Minister mentions electric shocks and water boarding as things that they might consider acceptable. He says the objective of using torture is to “capture these criminals” and argues because terrorists are so hard to detect, we must use everything in our means to get information from the few we have in custody.

The Leader Opposition attacks torture in a general sense and not the particularly weak definitions of the Prime Minister. She seemed to accept that the limits set on bodily harm were clear enough, and argued instead that the Proposition were ignoring the psychological trauma these suspects might suffer. She goes on to argue that information obtained under duress is not credible, terrorists operate in a dispersed manner and there are other better alternatives. One of her main thrusts is that terrorist organizations will cancel their plans once a member is caught, thereby evading arrest.

The Deputy Prime Minister argues that the value of information is subjective and many intelligence organizations have obtained useful information using torture. He also suggests that interrogators can increase the intensity of torture (”turn up the voltage”) if the suspect is not cooperating

The Member Proposition does not redefine torture but consistently uses clear examples of milder forms of torture (truth serums and sleep deprivation), and repackages torture as one tool in the arsenal of the war against terrorism, only referring to it as “hard interrogation techniques”. He also argues, and this is their extension, that torture creates a larger deterrence effect. So even if Opening Opposition’s argument that the information obtained would be useless because terrorists would change their plans, that in itself prevents the terrorists from launching an attack and thus creates a safer environment.

This topic requires a clear definition of torture that allows the Proposition bench to mitigate the evilness of torture and focus on its effectiveness. A vague setup would tend towards more, not less, torture. Closing Proposition thus inherits a hard case that is not clear – how do they support a policy they disagree with and still get a result from the debate? If Closing Proposition attempts to clarify the policy they risk contradicting their Opening team. Also, when the policy is unclear, it makes it harder to evaluate benefits of the policy and easier to show harms and abuse.

There are two interesting things Closing Government did in this debate. First, they changed the language used to refer to the policy (prompting the Opposition to claim a shift in policy) but without changing the policy itself. They also provided an extension that was responsive to the main opposition from Opening Opposition (raising attacks on the validity of their extension), by converting a weakness into a benefit.

The adjudication panel did not believe the Closing Proposition shifted Opening Proposition’s case. They basically did a better PR campaign for torture than Opening Proposition-they presented torture in a slighter softer light while increasing the rhetoric about how evil terrorists are and maintaining that they would not stop at anything to save innocent lives. They positioned torture as one of the necessary tools to combat terrorists; thereby impacting the lack of mutual exclusivity with the Oppositions alternative plans and making the use of torture seem more acceptable.

Their extension was valid and very effective. It was almost a rebuttal, but it was packaged well and significantly improved the effectiveness of torture as a tool to combat terrorism. They defended the validity of torture in finding useful information, but argued that even if we don’t find information that could lead to arrest, the use of hard interrogation techniques forces terrorists organizations to cancel their plans and that leads to saving lives. They packaged this as the deterrence impact of using torture, and I felt it was a significant enough contribution to the debate to constitute a valid extension.

This round provides an example of how to defend a Opening Proposition policy that might be too vague or hard, without contradicting the Opening Proposition, and that is by using better examples and more politically correct terminology. It also shows how a new perspective on the effectiveness of a policy can be used as an effective extension.

The Long Diagonal

December 8, 2008

The Round

Adjudicator:        Erin O’Brien (University of Queensland, Australia)

Tournament:       New Zealand BP Open Tournament

Location:             Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand

Dates:                 November 30 – December 1, 2008

Motion:               “This house would abolish all forms of affirmative action”

Teams:                OP:  (2nd)  Kathy Errington and Richard D’Ath (Victoria University)

OO: (4th)   Rohan Grey and Steph Paton (Sydney University)

CP:  (3rd)   Yogesh Patel and Hugh McCaffrey (Victoria University)

CO: (1st)    Polly Higbee and Stephen Whittington (Victoria University)

Abstract:        This debate presents an interesting example of a long-diagonal decision, highlighting some of the difficulties in judging debates where the hardest fought clash takes place between the Opening Proposition and Closing Opposition teams.

Discussion

Debates about affirmative action typically present opportunities for an ideological debate given life through discussion of personal motivations. Affirmative action policies in debates like these are often measured by their ability to change societal attitudes and to overcome some of the practical realities of historical and economic inequalities. This debate was no exception.

The Opening Proposition took a strong stance that affirmative action should be abolished because it had always caused harm and would not achieve its aims. They mounted their case on an individual, community-based and society-wide level, largely focusing on affirmative action programs in educational environments, for example college scholarships for African Americans in the United States. They argued that affirmative action reinforces a mentality that certain groups of people are not the ‘governing class’ because of an inherent disadvantage. They also argued that placing the emphasis on individuals to serve as role models is tokenistic and potentially damaging to both the individual and community when individuals cannot live up to expectations.

The Opening Opposition team countered this case with statements about the importance of diverse opinions and role models to overcome public stereotypes, the possible benefits of affirmative action candidates in government positions, and the need to reward potential rather than proven merit in some cases. The Opening Opposition’s case identified some of the key issues, but failed to get off the ground due to a lack of development of the arguments. The case presented an image of what ‘should’ or ‘could’ happen due to affirmative action, but no real proof of what ‘would’ happen as a result of affirmative action policies.

The Closing Proposition team crafted a clear extension that focused on the dangers of elevating individuals above groups. They argued that people who benefit from affirmative action policies in education are often ostracised by their communities, and in many cases do not return to ‘give back’ once they have benefited from the policy. They also argued that affirmative action policies can become politicised, leading to the pooling of resources in some communities to the disadvantage of others. This extension, though new, did not enable the Closing Proposition team to gain ground over the Opening Proposition. Although the arguments were creative and more developed than that of the Opening Opposition, the summation speech was not able to defend their arguments well against a strong attack from the Member of the Opposition, nor did the Proposition Whip engage the extension brought by Closing Opposition, causing problems for the Closing Proposition’s ability to fulfil their role in the debate.

After the fifth speech, many of the arguments made by Opening Proposition still remained largely unscathed, while at the same time the Opposition case had been quite thin. The Closing Opposition dealt with both problems. Primarily through rebuttal in both the Member and Whip speeches, the team managed to challenge the assertions of the Opening Government and at the same time fill the gaps in the Opening Opposition’s arguments.

Their own extension focused on a more practical analysis of the important roles that affirmative action candidates can play within their communities.  The Member Opposition argued that the harms to individuals asserted by the Opening Proposition were not being witnessed, particularly due to the large numbers of people still clamouring for affirmative action positions. They also effectively countered the Closing Proposition’s argument about ostracisation, as well as the Opening Proposition’s argument about societal perceptions through their substantive material on the role that individuals can play on a practical level. To illustrate this point they focused on the importance of diversity in community services like the police force, as well as in health, education and other government services.  They also enhanced the Opposition case with an argument about the importance of affirmative action candidates in government roles to address systemic inequalities by bringing real experience and understanding to deliver a needs-based system.

The dominance of the Opening Proposition and Closing Opposition teams in this debate created an adjudication conundrum that is commonly known as the ‘long diagonal,’ where teams that are vying for the win have not directly faced each other despite clashing over the same issues.  For teams in this situation, the goal of being the most persuasive on the key issues should not change. However, there are strategic manoeuvres that can be employed by teams who spot a long diagonal in the making. The Closing Opposition must still fulfill their role of responding to the Closing Proposition extension, but their primary focus of attack should be the Opening Proposition. Many teams make the mistake of going for the easier target of refuting the weaker arguments of a closing team in the hope that adjudicators will simply forget the stronger analysis that came earlier. It is also worthwhile trying to take a point of information from the opening team to demonstrate to the judges that even when they have a chance to come back, you are still able to undermine their arguments. Shutting a strong team out of POIs makes you look weak, not them. Of course the options for the Opening Proposition are limited, though if the chance to offer a POI arises, it is better to make a point that undermines either one of their key arguments, or refutes an attack on one of yours. Opening Proposition teams often make the mistake of offering POIs in the closing half of the debate that simply reiterate their case, rather than advancing it.

For adjudicators, the long diagonal requires a comparison of the individual cases on their merits, as well as a consideration of whatever back and forth existed between the teams. In these situations, asking yourself a few key questions can often help – Did the Opening Proposition’s case stand up to scrutiny from the Closing Opposition? Was the Closing Opposition’s case comprehensive and convincing, or just more recent? Which team’s case was the most persuasive on the key issues of the debate? Where there is a lack of direct clash between the two teams vying for the win, the question of which team had the best and most persuasive analysis becomes even more important.

Although the teams in this debate had no opportunity to clash with each other, and in particular the Opening Proposition had no opportunity to defend their case against attacks later in the debate, it was still possible to judge which case was more convincing.

Both teams focused on the role that those who have benefited from affirmative action can play in changing societal attitudes. While the Opening Proposition case largely focused on the perceptions that would result from affirmative action policies, the Closing Opposition case explored the practical outcomes that would influence both perception and reality regarding inequality.  The Closing Opposition also effectively undermined many of the conclusions that Opening Proposition had drawn about the impact of affirmative action policies throughout the debate. From a strategic point of view, the inability of the Deputy Prime Minister to respond strongly to a point of information from the Closing Opposition about the large numbers of people still clamouring for affirmative spots in education despite the OP’s allegation that these people were treated as inferior exposed a vulnerability in the case of the Proposition that was later effectively exploited.

Ultimately the efforts of the Closing Opposition to attack the Opening Proposition throughout the debate, and to deliver convincing arguments that dealt with both perception and reality, won the debate.

Back to Basics

November 25, 2008

The Round

Adjudicator:       Neill Harvey-Smith (Debate Chamber)

Tournament:      Oxford Inter-Varsity Competition 2008

Location:            Oxford, UK

Dates:                 November 7-8, 2008

Motion:               “This House Would Negotiate With Al-Qaeda”

Teams:                OP: (3rd) Aliyah Akram and Charlotte Thomas (Cambridge)

OO: (1st) Yulia Tell and Elena Zhukova (HSE Moscow)

CP: (2nd) Luke Harris and Shane Lyons (UCC Philosophical Society)

CO: (4th) Filip Popovic and Richard Robinson (Manchester)

Abstract:             The OP limit the debate to hostage-taking situations. The OO make powerful arguments without overtly linking them to OP’s points. CP move onto the effects on Al-Qaeda without directly linking back to OO’s points. CO question the definition but then rebut and summarise stylishly.

Discussion

This debate was messy and the adjudicators were unable to distinguish quickly between the teams. The Opening Proposition limited the debate to hostage-taking situations. The Opening Opposition made powerful arguments without overtly linking them to Opening Proposition’s points. Closing Proposition moved onto the effects of negotiations on Al-Qaeda without directly linking back to Opening Opposition’s points. Closing Opposition questioned Opening Proposition’s definition but then rebutted and summarised stylishly.

The panel quickly agreed that Opening Proposition’s definition was fair, but could have been improved by some sense, even a word, about how and where in the world Al-Qaeda might be currently taking hostages.  Opening Proposition’s substantive arguments were under-developed. “It is a role of the state to save lives” was not explained or balanced against other roles of the state, like the conduct of foreign policy. The harms of inaction were that “we will come across as callous and that will let them win,” which didn’t give us a real picture of the causal chain by which the callousness is made manifest. Similarly, “if we pay them off, they will look less strong” was not properly substantiated. The tragic case of Ken Bigley was mentioned, but not tied convincingly to either point.

Opening Opposition took a different tone to the gentle, more theoretical Cambridge approach. The angrily delivered opening—that Al-Qaeda wanted to destroy Western civilisation—certainly grabbed attention. The Opening Opposition’s main arguments were: that paying ransoms will turn hostages into tools for trading so more hostages will be captured; that Al-Qaeda had no central point to negotiate with, no aims or conditions which could realistically be met; that there is no basis to rely upon promises made; that this would show fear and strengthen their recruiting efforts. HSE gave a credible account. But nowhere did they specifically tie their points to the Opening Proposition’s arguments, showing how they rebutted the proposition case. This created work for the adjudicators in forming a direct comparison: upon reflection, the points of the Opening Opposition could be construed to deal directly with Opening Proposition’s case. In a panel discussion featuring tension between “The Opening Opposition didn’t rebut” and “The Opening Opposition were more persuasive,” the latter criterion decided it.

Closing Proposition started weakly with a “why now” argument, based on the unsubstantiated premise that people are sick of the war on terror. Their second idea was that there were two types of Al-Qaeda: those who don’t have objectives and those who do. We should negotiate with type two, calling their bluff by offering them things they have been asking for. When the West reveals itself amenable to reasoned negotiation, they will lose a powerful recruiting tool and weaken.

The third Proposition speaker, who introduced these ideas, never explained why we should believe his characterisation of Al-Qaeda over the disparate, cellular, rag-tag organisations described by Opening Opposition. It would be convenient if there were moderate Al-Qaeda operatives with whom to negotiate, but who are they and where can they be found? His partner, in a good, articulate summary of his side, gave the first, damning example of a bargaining chip: the demand that US troops leave Saudi Arabia. Opening Proposition had specifically excluded such major concessions as part of their model. Adjudicators were left confused, after four proposition speeches, about the basics: to whom do we talk, about what, for what?

Closing Opposition were stylistically strong. However, they started with a full minute challenging the right of Opening Proposition to narrow the debate to hostage-taking situations. They questioned whether Al-Qaeda even take hostages. Irrespective of the truth or falsehood of this claim, it was bad strategy. Closing Opposition must not introduce a definitional challenge to a debate. When they finally moved on, there was some strong rebuttal on weaker proposition points: Obama won vowing to take troops out of Iraq but into Afghanistan to challenge Al-Qaeda, so are people really sick of the war on terror? The summary was clear and organised, but points were mishandled. There was little in the speech that moved beyond Opening Opposition, sending a clear sign to the adjudicators that his partner’s contribution had been insufficient.

In the final analysis, we had to weigh several competing factors. Closing Proposition had asserted a distinction between types of Al-Qaeda without properly justifying it and based a lot of analysis on that distinction. The Proposition summary was the best speech in the round, but the Closing Proposition hadn’t done enough to beat Opening Opposition. Closing Opposition were stylistically strong but had committed a terrible error in challenging the definition. Seeing the debate through that prism, they had added little new.

We placed Opening Opposition first and Closing Opposition fourth. Deciding between Opening Proposition and Closing Proposition was tough. Both had flaws in argumentation, Opening Proposition not expanding well, Closing Proposition not establishing their premise. Opening Proposition had been active, making points of information throughout. We preferred the style of the latter team; on balance, we found them marginally more persuasive in the round.

This debate highlights the importance of the basic question in debating: was this persuasive? In a messy debate, where teams have varying strengths, there can be a temptation for judges to try to disqualify teams based on their weaknesses. This should be avoided in favour of a return to the basic question. Similarly, teams should ensure that they do the simple things well, articulating where the debate is and how they intend to progress it.  Fundamental skills—like refutation, identifying the proper locus of the conflict and role fulfilment—take on new importance in a debate difficult to decide on substantive issues.

Limiting Proposition Ground

September 15, 2008

The Round

Adjudicator:         Steven Johnson (University of Alaska, USA)

Tournament:        IDEA Youth Forum BP Track

Location:              Smolyan, Bulgaria

Dates:                  August 2-4, 2008

Motion:                “This house would require law enforcement agents to carry only non-lethal weapons.”

Teams:                OP:     (4th)     Kristina Aluzaite (Lithuania) and Martin Mets (Estonia)

OO:     (2nd)     Ana Salapic and Dina Salapic (Croatia)

CP:     (1st)     Hadar Tamir and Naama Peled (Israel)

CO:     (3rd)     Jesse Towson (USA) and Spela Zupan (Slovenia)

Abstract:             The Opening Proposition offers a definition of the motion that attempts to limit Proposition ground.  In response to criticism from the Opening Opposition, the Closing Proposition offers a justification of the limited definition that not only functions as a compelling alternative to a traditional extension but saves the Proposition’s case.

Discussion

This motion offers more temptation than most for an Opening Proposition to attempt to limit the debate.  To defend that law enforcement agents should face potentially armed criminals with only non-lethal weapons is a difficult assignment for any Opening Proposition; most will at least entertain the desire to limit exposure to Opposition attacks by defining the motion to allow some law enforcement agents to retain their guns.  This strategy, though, likely presents more risk than rewards.

In this round, the Prime Minister defines “law enforcement agents” to include regular police and security officials but specifically to exclude so-called “special weapons and tactics (SWAT)” units.  The Prime Minister offers no justification for this exclusion.  The case features a discussion of how those law enforcement agencies without firearms will be able to call upon the SWAT units to provide support in cases requiring greater “firepower.”

The Leader Opposition complains that the limitation is without merit or justification.  Moreover, the Leader Oppositioin argues that-by defining the motion so that SWAT units will retain the use of firearms-the PM has essentially granted that law enforcement agencies need firearms to meet criminal threats and, therefore, the motion is false.  The Deputy Prime Minister doesn’t attempt to defend the definition but merely reiterates the Prime Minister’s claim that regular cops can call upon SWAT units to meet the threat of armed criminals.  At this point in the round, the Opening Proposition’s case is severely compromised.

In an unconventional move, the Member Proposition chooses to take up the definitional issue in the second half of the debate.  Rather than ignoring the problem and merely offering an extension based on the Opening Proposition’s compromised definition, she offers a subtle and ultimately successful justification of the exclusion of SWAT units from the prohibition on firearms.  Even though SWAT units are law enforcement agencies, the Member Parliament claims that the exclusion of these units from the prohibition is warranted given the nature the threats they face.  Regular cops, because they are first on the scene, regularly encounter situations of intense, urgent threat that require immediate response in circumstances with imperfect and incomplete information.  In these situations, the Member Proposition claims, the potential for error is great and the consequences of those errors are amplified by the presence of lethal weapons.  SWAT units, on the other hand, have time and perspective to gather information, develop strategy, marshal resources and execute a plan with forethought and deliberation.  This distinction, the Member Proposition claims, justifies limiting the restriction on lethal weapons to only those law enforcement agencies that must react to immediate threats and liberates the Proposition from having to prove that all law enforcement agents should be without lethal weapons.

On first blush, the PM’s definition flies in the face of conventional wisdom in BP debating: when faced with a broad motion, the commonly accepted strategy is to defend the broadest interpretation of that motion.  For this motion, the broadest interpretation would be to prohibit the use of lethal weapons by all law enforcement agencies.  Most adjudicators would be suspicious of what appears to a definition designed to circumvent likely Opposition attacks and sympathetic to Opposition claims that the motion-because of the limited definition-is not proved true by the Opening Proposition’s effort.  Indeed, in this round, I was very critical of the Opening Proposition’s failure to explain their focus, particularly in the face of an objection to the interpretation by the Opening Opposition team.

Closing Proposition teams often find themselves required to defend the former Proposition team’s less-than-perfect interpretation of the motion.  In this case, the MP could have hoped that the “blame” for the definitional messiness of the debate would rest squarely on the shoulders of the Opening Proposition team and that a well-argued Closing Proposition extension focused on merits of limiting regular cops to non-lethal weapons would demonstrate the Closing Proposition’s proficiency, even if that extension didn’t ultimately prove the motion true.  Such a strategy would likely have resulted in a ranking no higher than 2nd, since the Opening Opposition would likely get credit for an effective deconstruction of the Opening Proposition’s definitional strategy and the case-regardless of the effectiveness of the Closing Proposition’s extension-would still be wounded.

Rather than invest the Closing Proposition in a crippled strategy, the MP opted instead to forgo a traditional extension and focus on the definitional debate.  By doing so, she appeared to be proactive and in control of the definitional issue rather than merely reacting to the (less-than-desirable) circumstances in which they had been placed by the Opening Proposition’s definition.  The MP’s substantive distinction between the circumstances of ordinary policing and special-circumstance policing by SWAT units, her connection of the hazards of lethal weapons to those circumstances in which ordinary cops find themselves and the resulting justification for retaining the use of firearms by SWAT units not only answered decisively the definitional issue (indeed, the Closing Opposition made no mention of the definitional issue) it resurrected an otherwise weak Opening Proposition’s case.  The Closing Proposition was rewarded with a 1st place for this round.

This round presents a great example of both the risks and rewards of deviating from conventional wisdom (both by the Opening Proposition and Closing Proposition) and emphasizes the benefits of an honest assessment of the circumstances of the round and the flexibility to adapt to those circumstances.